Gender Inequality and Armed Conflict

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ReCIPE Virtual Class - April 2026

Class Overview

Class Overview

Reading List:

- **Gender and Armed Conflict** — Siwan Anderson and Maria Micaela Sviatschi: *Economic Policy* (2025)
- **Climate Shocks and Female Targeted Political Violence** — Siwan Anderson and Daniel Jaramillo Calderon: *CEPR Discussion Paper* (2025)
- **Cultural Distance and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence** — Eleonora Guarnieri and Ana Tur-Prats: *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2023)
- **Conflict and Female Leadership: Evidence from Colombia** — Francisco Eslava: *Working Paper* (2026)

Gender Inequality and Conflict

Gender Inequality and Conflict

Figure: Conflict Incidence and Gender Legal Equality



Data Sources: UCDP; Women, Business and the Law (WBL); Conflicts between 2010 and 2023.

Gender Inequality and Conflict

Figure: Conflict Incidence and Gender Equal Norms



Data Sources: UCDP; UNDP Gender Social Norms Index (GSNI).
Conflicts between 2010 and 2023.

Gender Inequality and Conflict

Figure: Conflict Incidence and Gender Equality - Estimations



Gender Inequality and Conflict

Two main channels to explain this overall correlation

- Institutional
- Norms-based
- Rest on assumption that women are more peaceful/less violent (inherently different preferences)

Institutional:

- gender-equal societies
- women more likely to attain leadership positions
- pursue peaceful policies and avoid use of force

Cultural:

- male-biased societies promote patriarchal values
- honour and aggressive masculinity
- normalize violence
- foster militaristic tendencies

Gender Inequality and Conflict

Causal empirical evidence is scant and mixed

Figure: Gender Inequality and Armed Conflict



Two-way relationship sets up the structure of lecture

- conflict disproportionately disadvantages and victimizes women
- women as active participants and agents of change in conflict and peace-building processes

Conflict Victims

Gender Based Violence in Conflict

Extensive documentation of case study evidence

- 612 million women and girls living within 50 km of conflicts — 150% increase relative to a decade ago
- 75% of displaced people are women and children
- Rape of women long been endemic feature of war
- Enormous scope for causal empirical investigations

Questions:

- Determinants of GBV across varied conflict and post-conflict settings?
- Determinants of different forms of GBV?
- Why do some conflict actors commit GBV and others do not?

Political science literature on CRSV (Wood (2006)):

1. Tactic of war with an intentional purpose
2. Tolerated - not ordered by superiors
3. Committed opportunistically by individual combatants

Gender-Based Violence in Conflict

Datasets for quantitative exploration:

- Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset: builds on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database – prevalence of sexual violence level committed by armed actors for each conflict during years 1989-2021 (Cohen and Nordås (2014)
- Sexual violence is category in ACLED (1997 to 2018)
- Dataset of 'collective rape' coded from newspaper articles covers 37 countries (Green (2004))
- Global variation in sexual violence by state security forces (Butler and Gluch (2007))
- 'Extreme war rape' in 27 countries (Farr (2009))

Gender-Based Violence in Conflict

Figure: Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict



Data Sources: SVAC. (1989-2021).
Total number conflicts with sexual violence committed by armed actors.

Gender-Based Violence in Conflict

Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC): cross-sectional time series data Cohen and Nordås (2014):

- Prevalence of sexual violence in conflict varies dramatically by perpetrator group
- Sexual violations are common, but not ubiquitous
- Even within same country or conflict setting — some armed groups commit sexual violence while others do not

Why?

- State militaries more likely to be perpetrators of sexual violence compared to either rebel groups or militias Leiby (2009))
- Sexual violence continues into post-conflict period (sometimes at very high levels)

Gender-Based Violence in Conflict - Quantitative Economic Analyses

Cultural Distance and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence — Eleonora Guarnieri and Ana Tur-Prats: *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2023)

Climate Shocks and Female Targeted Political Violence — Siwan Anderson and Daniel Jaramillo Calderon: *CEPR Discussion Paper* (2025)

Economic Analysis - Guarnieri & Tur-Prats

FIGURE 1: *Murdock ethnic groups' use of sexual violence in armed conflict (1989-2009) in Africa*



Economic Analysis - Guarnieri & Tur-Prats

MDI: PCA Loadings

	Loading
Gender equal traits	
Matrilineal	−0.049
Polygyny	−0.232
Dependence on shifting agriculture	−0.054
Dependence on nonherding husbandry	−0.386
Dependence on gathering	−0.394
Dependence on fishing	−0.375
Male dominant traits	
Plough use	0.340
Dependence on pastoralism	0.520
Nuclear family	0.195
Ambiguous trait	
Bride price	0.165

Economic Analysis - Guarnieri & Tur-Prats



Economic Analysis - Guarnieri & Tur-Prats

TABLE III

MALE DOMINANCE AND CRSV: MAIN RESULTS

	Dependent variable: CRSV (0–3)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perpetrator MDI	1.74***	1.74***	1.76***	1.78***	1.76***	1.80***
	(0.523)	(0.524)	(0.548)	(0.669)	(0.550)	(0.600)
Mean dep. var.	0.396	0.396	0.396	0.398	0.396	0.396
Observations	3,188	3,188	3,188	3,107	3,188	3,136
Clusters	337	337	337	333	337	335
Adjusted R^2	0.277	0.288	0.369	0.399	0.369	0.337
Conflict FE	√	√	√		√	
Year FE		√	√		√	
Conflict-specific time trend			√		√	
Conflict-year FE				√		
Country FE					√	
Country-year FE						√

Economic Analysis - Guarnieri & Tur-Prats

Cultural Distance in Gender Norms and CRSV

	Dependent variable: CRSV (0–3)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Absolute distance	2.32***				
	(0.882)				
Perpetrator MDI		−1.47	1.72	−1.41	
		(1.202)	(1.798)	(2.095)	
Perpetrator more male dominant		3.24***		3.25***	4.19***
		(1.229)		(1.228)	(1.343)
Perpetrator less male dominant			−0.03	0.07	1.20
			(1.787)	(1.797)	(0.968)
Mean dep. var.	0.402	0.398	0.398	0.398	0.402
Observations	2,993	3,063	3,063	3,063	2,993
Clusters	257	270	270	270	257
Adjusted R^2	0.587	0.375	0.373	0.375	0.587
Conflict FE	√	√	√	√	√
Year FE	√	√	√	√	√
Conflict-specific time trend	√	√	√	√	√
Perpetrator FE	√				√

Economic Analysis - Guarnieri & Tur-Prats

LINGUISTIC DISTANCE AND CRSV

	Dependent variable: CRSV (0–3)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Absolute distance	2.29***	2.25***				
	(0.861)	(0.841)				
Perpetrator more male dominant			4.16***	4.11***		
			(1.322)	(1.305)		
Perpetrator less male dominant			1.14	1.08		
			(1.002)	(1.022)		
Linguistic distance	– 0.04		– 0.06		– 0.09	
	(0.125)		(0.117)		(0.104)	
Linguistic distance (residuals)		– 0.04		– 0.06		– 0.16
		(0.125)		(0.117)		(0.125)
Mean dep. var.	0.402	0.402	0.402	0.402	0.394	0.402
Observations	2,993	2,993	2,993	2,993	3,205	2,993
Clusters	257	257	257	257	276	257
Adjusted R^2	0.586	0.586	0.587	0.587	0.580	0.586
Conflict FE	√	√	√	√	√	√
Year FE	√	√	√	√	√	√
Conflict-specific time trend	√	√	√	√	√	√
Perpetrator FE	√	√	√	√	√	√

Economic Analysis - Anderson & Jaramillo

Political Violence Targeting Women (PVTW) [ACLED]:

- Political or public forms of violence [excludes IPV]
- Only incidents involving physical violence
- extrajudicial killings; beating, shooting, torture, rape, and mutilation; abductions and forced disappearances; wartime sexual violence; mob attacks on civilian women and girls; suppression of women involved in political processes; punishments for violating gender norms (veiling, accusations of witchcraft)

Male perpetrators:

- Organized armed actors with political motive
- state forces; rebel groups, militias, gangs

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Economic Analysis - Anderson & Jaramillo

Figure 1: Political Violence Against Women, 1997 - 2019

(a) PVTW as Share of All Events



(b) Geographical Distribution



Economic Analysis - Anderson & Jaramillo

Table 1: Temperature and PVTW

	Event Indicator				Deadly Event Indicator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Full Sample								
Temperature	0.041***	0.041***	0.015**	0.016**	0.024***	0.024***	0.011**	0.011**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
L1.Temperature	0.038***	0.039***	0.020***	0.019***	0.020***	0.020***	0.009**	0.009*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
Observations	60,236	60,236	60,236	60,236	60,236	60,236	60,236	60,236
Panel B: Cells With Crops								
Temperature	0.038***	0.040***	0.005	0.004	0.023***	0.024***	0.006	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
L1.Temperature	0.038***	0.040***	0.016**	0.014*	0.019***	0.020***	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Observations	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536
Panel C: Cells Without Crops								
Temperature	0.012	0.012	0.008	0.010	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
L1.Temperature	0.009	0.008	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	18,700	18,700	18,700	18,700	18,700	18,700	18,700	18,700
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grid FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Country-time trend	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Economic Analysis - Anderson & Jaramillo

Figure 4: Female Empowerment Indicators



(a) Share of Female Crops



(b) Major Crop Female



(c) Inverse of Male Development Index (MDI)

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Table 2: Temperature, Female Empowerment, and PVTW

	Event Indicator				Deadly Event Indicator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Share of Female Crops by Grid								
Temperature	0.098***	0.105***	0.047**	0.050**	0.058***	0.062***	0.025**	0.028**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)
L1.Temperature	0.109***	0.116***	0.069***	0.072***	0.059***	0.062***	0.033***	0.036***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Share Female Crops × Temperature	-0.090***	-0.096***	-0.061**	-0.066**	-0.052***	-0.056***	-0.026*	-0.030*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Share Female Crops × L1.Temperature	-0.107***	-0.114***	-0.078***	-0.086***	-0.061***	-0.064***	-0.040**	-0.046***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Observations	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536
Panel B: Major Crop in Grid								
Temperature	0.091***	0.096***	0.040**	0.046***	0.055***	0.057***	0.024**	0.029**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)
L1.Temperature	0.074***	0.079***	0.036**	0.039**	0.041***	0.043***	0.017	0.020
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Major Crop Female × Temperature	-0.063***	-0.066***	-0.041***	-0.048***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.020*	-0.026**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Major Crop Female × L1.Temperature	-0.043**	-0.046**	-0.023	-0.029*	-0.026*	-0.028*	-0.013	-0.018
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Observations	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536	41,536
Panel C: Female Positive Norms								
Temperature	0.049***	0.049***	0.020***	0.021**	0.029***	0.029***	0.013**	0.014**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
L1.Temperature	0.046***	0.047***	0.026***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Inv. MDI × Temperature	-0.018***	-0.016***	-0.007	-0.009*	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.006*	-0.007**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Inv. MDI × L1.Temperature	-0.014***	-0.013**	-0.005	-0.006	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.006*	-0.006*
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Observations	53,240	53,196	53,196	53,196	53,196	53,196	53,196	53,196
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grid FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Country-time trend	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Economic Analysis - Anderson & Jaramillo

Table 4: Perpetrators' Motives - PVTW and SPEI

	Event Indicator				Deadly Event Indicator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SPEI GS	0.024*	0.028**	0.013	0.014	0.010	0.012	0.002	0.002
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
L1.SPEI GS	0.044***	0.047***	0.025***	0.025**	0.022***	0.023***	0.009	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Major Crop Female × SPEI GS	-0.043***	-0.049***	-0.024*	-0.025*	-0.018*	-0.020*	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Major Crop Female × L1.SPEI GS	-0.056***	-0.060***	-0.034***	-0.036***	-0.026***	-0.028***	-0.013*	-0.013
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)
SPEI	-0.028**	-0.032***	-0.011	-0.011	-0.013*	-0.014*	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
L1.SPEI	-0.044***	-0.047***	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.021***	-0.023***	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Major Crop Female × SPEI	0.034***	0.038***	0.021**	0.023**	0.012	0.013*	0.003	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Major Crop Female × L1.SPEI	0.037***	0.040***	0.020**	0.022**	0.018**	0.019**	0.008	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Observations	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Grid FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Year FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Country-time trend	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0334	0.0334	0.0334	0.0334	0.0164	0.0164	0.0164	0.0164
Observations	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338	41,338

Gender-Based Consequences of Conflict

Extensive empirical literature documenting long-term causal consequences for women and girls from exposure to conflict violence

1. Intimate Partner Violence
2. Education and Health
3. Forced Displacement
4. Demographic Shifts

Intimate Partner Violence

Significant empirical evidence that exposure to armed conflict — heightened levels of IPV among victims of war

Combining data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) with records of conflict events (GIS located)

- Exploit within-country variation in conflict exposure across survey clusters and over year of birth or marriage

Sub-Saharan Africa

- La Mattina and Shemyakina (2024); La Mattina (2017); Ajefu and Casale (2024); Ekhator-Mobayode et al. (2022)

Ex-Soviet countries

- Armenia, Azerbijan, Moldova, Tajikistan (Torrisi (2021))

Latin America

- Peru (Gutierrez and Gallegos (2016)); Colombia (Svallfors (2023))

Intimate Partner Violence

Why?

Normalization of violence:

- War can have a desensitizing effect on the perception of violence and create a dehumanized view of victims
- Psychosocial repercussions of war trauma could result in more aggressive behaviours on behalf of men
- Evidence from women in the U.S. married to active-duty military (Cesur and Sabia (2016))
- Individual soldiers exposed to wartime sexual violence against women during conflict between the Angolan government and the UNITA rebels (Stojetz and Brück (2023))

Intimate Partner Violence

Amplification of patriarchal norms:

- Violence against women viewed as natural behaviour of being male
- Evidence demonstrates a worsening of other female empowerment indicators as result of conflict (e.g. relative household decision-making)
- Ajefu and Casale (2024); Ekhator-Mobayode et al. (2022); La Mattina et al. (2017); Dahl et al. (2021); Amelia Gibbons and Rossi (2022)
- Find consequences for women of greater IPV with increased exposure to military bases (patriarchal norms)
- Parra and Shibuya (2024): track military base locations across Colombian municipalities (1998 - 2016)
- Brodeur et al. (2017): placement of US military bases during Vietnam War increases contemporary prevalence of commercial sex workers in Thailand

Health and Education Outcomes

Lack of essential services – disproportionate impact on females?

- *Health Outcomes* - Worse for women (reproductive)
- **sub Saharan Africa** (Amberg et al. (2023); Torrisi (2024); Wagner and et al. (2019); Kotsadam and Østby (2019)); **Palestine** (Mansour and Rees (2012)); **Peru** (Grimard and Laszlo (2014); Leon (2012))
- *Educational Outcomes* - Worse for girls
- **Peru** (Grimard and Laszlo (2014); Leon (2012)); **Rwanda** (La Mattina et al. (2017)); **Tajikistan** (Shemyakina (2011))

Other contexts/outcomes – strong gender differences not so apparent – boys equally disadvantaged

- *Educational Outcomes*:
- **sub Saharan Africa** (Amberg et al. (2023); Akresh et al. (2012)); Bertoni et al. (2019)); **Guatemala** (Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011)); **Cambodia** (Islam et al. (2016))
- *Health Outcomes* (Vaccinations):
- **sub Saharan Africa** (Amberg et al. (2023); (Minoiu and Shemyakina (2014)); **Colombia** (Guerra-Cújar et al. (2020))

Forced Displacement

UNHCR and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre databases:

- 10.6 million women were displaced (2009)
- 16.2 million women (2017)
- Vast majority were based in six countries (Bendavid et al. (2021)):
- Syria, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia

Causal estimates of impacts:

- Native versus refugee gaps
- Worse female employment outcomes, early marriage, increased IPV – Syrian and Bosnian refugees (Gökçe and Kïrdar (2024); Foster et al. (2024); Demirci and Kırdar (2023); Kondylis (2010))

Conflict Actors

Female Actors in Conflict

So far:

- Direction of causality running from conflict to gendered outcomes

Females not just victims:

- Direction of causality from gender equality to conflict outcomes
- Received relatively limited attention in economics literature
- Political science scholars constructed relevant databases

Female Conflict Actors:

- Resistance Fighters
- Peace-Builders
- Grassroots Movements

Resistance Fighters

Figure: Rebel Groups with Female Participation



Data Sources: WAAR.
Total number of rebel groups with female participation between 1946-2015.
Majority rebel organizations (63%) include women

Peace-Builders

Impacts of female inclusion in rebel groups:

- Increases likelihood of engaging in peace talks with the state (Brannon et al. (2024); Eslava (2024))
- Easier transition into formal political parties (Brannon (2023))

Lack of men (biased sex ratios) opens up power vacuum

- Increase female election rates for political office (Rogall and Zárate-Barrera (2020); García-Ponce (2022))

Success in politics depends on degree of sexual violence in conflict

- Positive effects of conflict on female political participation diminished in areas strongly affected by sexual violence (García-Ponce (2022); Brannon (2023))

Peace-Builders: Eslava (2026)

Figure 4: Jurisdiction of FARC blocks and location of fronts



Peace-Builders: Eslava (2026)

Figure 5: Geographical distribution of guerrilla attacks between 1998 and 2016 and female electoral success



Peace-Builders: Eslava



Peace-Builders: Eslava

Table 3: Female guerrilla leadership and conflict

Dep. var: yearly avg. # of guerrilla attacks (per 100,000 inhabitants)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	FARC structure with female influence			
	Block		Front	
Female FARC commander	-0.149	-1.405**	-1.319**	-1.205**
	(0.360)	(0.622)	(0.598)	(0.404)
Observations	6007	2175	2175	1023
Mean of dep. var			2.195	
FARC variation:	Stability	Visibility	Stability	Visibility

Peace-Builders: Eslava

Table 4: Synergies in the interaction between female leaders

Dep. var: number of one-sided guerrilla attacks (per 100,000 inhabitants and electoral cycle)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Estimation:	RD - split sample by gender of commander				OLS - yearly sample	
Gender of commander:	Female	Non female	Female	Non female		
Female mayor	-8.216**	1.571	-5.967*	-0.652		
	(3.884)	(3.763)	(3.056)	(6.356)		
Female commander × female mayor					-0.087**	-0.164*
					(0.003)	(0.013)
FARC unit:	Block	Block	Front	Front	Block	Front
Year Fixed effects:	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality Fixed effects:	X	X	X	X	✓	✓
Observations	115	123	67	80	6826	3301
Mean of dep. var	3.819	4.048	2.562	4.526	0.430	

Grassroots Movements

Challenge of causal identification from female leadership roles to conflict reduction

- Complicated by: conflict exposure may incite women to mobilize politically
- e.g. positive correlation between high levels of conflict-related sexual violence and increased women's protest activity [Kreft (2018); Agerberg and Kreft (2020); García-Ponce (2022)]

Important area of study;

- Women's grassroots mobilization can play role in community protection and peace advocacy
- Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace
- Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina
- Women's League in Burma
- Mothers of Soacha in Colombia

Gender-Based Policies and Conflict

Global Commitment:
Landmark resolution number 1325 of UN Security Council in year 2000:

- Affirmed important role of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, post-conflict reconstruction
- Western states have increasingly allocated substantial portions of their official development assistance (ODA) to gender-related initiatives

Gender-Based Policies and Conflict

Peace Agreements (PA-X) Database (1990 to 2021) across 54 countries

- Code gender for all individuals mentioned in agreements (Good (2024))
- Women's involvement positively correlated to agreements containing special provisions for females
- Dependent on women holding positions of power - having women in the room is insufficient
- Female combatant prevalence associated with peace terms advocating for equality for women and gender-inclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plans, and rehabilitation programs (Thomas (2024))

Gender-Based Policies and Conflict - Interventions

Foreign aid donors committed to Community Driven Development (CDD) programs in war-torn countries

- Quotas for women is typical part of their design
- Researchers have evaluated RCT style CDD interventions: Sierra Leone, DRC, and Afghanistan (Casey et al. (2012); Humphreys et al. (2015); Beath et al. (2013))
- Successful program in Afghanistan mandated gender-balanced village development council, equal participation of men and women in council elections and selection of development projects

Poverty alleviating programs targeted towards women

- Analyses of RCT style interventions (Uganda and Afghanistan) (Blattman et al. (2016); Green et al. (2015); Bedoya et al. (2019); Aiken et al. (2023))
- Positive effects for female micro-enterprise activity

Gender-Based Policies and Conflict - Interventions

Interventions to reduce IPV in conflict-affected settings:

- Women for Women International (WfWI) program (Gibbs et al. (2018))
- Sessions of a gender dialogue curriculum [Annan et al. (2017); Gupta et al. (2013)]
- school intervention Amaral et al. (2024)

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Evaluating gender-focused interventions in active conflict zones remains logistically and ethically challenging

- Post-conflict settings and refugee camps may offer more practical opportunities for conducting rigorous policy evaluations

Future Directions

Significant work underway to identify serious long-term consequences of exposure to GBV in armed conflict

- Far less identifying key determinants of occurrence of GBV

Women have active roles in conflict – majority of rebel groups

- Not much quantitative causal research
- Innovative collated data sets in political science literature

Political role of women in post-conflict contexts

- Less quantitative causal research
- Innovative collated data sets in political science literature
- Potential for amalgamating new date sets – growing use of large language models applied to extensive written documentation on conflict resolutions
- Explorations into presence and consequences of female representation in informal political institutions and grassroots organisations

Future Directions

Great scope for more experimental research on gender inequality in conflict and post-conflict settings

- Few evaluations of standard poverty-alleviating interventions
- Experimental work aimed directly at evaluating policies to reduce GBV and other gender-biased behaviours seems paramount

Great potential for theoretical work

- Conceptualizing more formally why some armed actors engage in GBV while others do not
- Theoretical frameworks which explicitly address political economy forces and tensions determining participation or exclusion of women in peace-building and conflict resolution

The End - Thank you!