Family, Kinship, and Social Relations

Nathan Nunn *Harvard University*

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Social structures (other than state centralization)

- Family structure
  - Polygamous vs. monogamous
  - Nuclear vs. extended
  - Matrilocal & patrilocal vs. neolocal
- Kinship / lineage organization
  - Patrilineal & matrilineal vs. cognatic descent
  - Segmented lineages
- Age-based organization
  - Age sets and age grades

Institutional consequences of kinship systems?

- Emmanuel Todd. 1985. *The Explanation of Ideology*.




Figure 3 Values underlying family types within Europe. A diagramatic depiction along two axes (liberty/authority and equality/inequality) gives a squared figure with four boxes, each one representing one family type. It shows at a glance the differences and similarities between the types. The two family models on any side of the square have one shared characteristic: liberty or equality. The two diametrically opposed models, which touch only at the centre point, differ in every sense, both in their attitude towards liberty and in that towards equality. The egalitarian nuclear family and the authoritarian family lie directly opposite each other, as do the absolute nuclear family and the community family.





Figure 4 Regions of family types within Europe

The West is WEIRD


- Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan. "Most people are WEIRD," *Nature*, 2010.
- Henich, Heine, and Norenzayan. "The WEIRDest people in the world?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010.
- Jones. "A WEIRD view of human nature skews psychologists' studies," *Science*, 2010.

- **W**estern
- **E**ducated
- **I**ndustrialized
- **R**ich
- **D**emocratic


It is a duty towards society to have children? 1-5 scale




Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?




History and ancestry: 7000+ languages and dialects from Ethnologue



Proportion of population with ancestors that had: Independent nuclear families



Proportion of population with ancestors that had: A preference for cousin marriage



Has Europe always been different?

Source: Goody (1983a,b), Henrich (2020)

Social structure in Europe before the Medieval period:

1. Kin-based organization (e.g., clans, lineages, etc)
2. Society was patrilineal and patrilocal.
3. Kinship units collectively owned and allocated land.
4. Kinship units took "a corporate form," meaning they organized/determined political, legal, and social rights of its members.
5. Women were under the control of their fathers or husbands.
6. Arranged marriages were customary, including cousin marriage.
7. For wealthy and powerful men, polygamy was common.

The effects of the Church in Europe

Source: Goody (1983a,b), Henrich (2020)

- Beginning in the 5th century AD, the Church began to implement rules to weaken traditional lineage systems.
- Banned:
  - Cousin marriage (up to the 7th degree of relatedness).
  - Marrying dead husband's brother or dead wife's sister.
  - Marrying relatives of spiritual kin (e.g., relatives of godparents).
  - Polygamy and concubinage
- Promoted:
  - Nuclear family over lineages or clans.
  - Love marriage over arranged marriages.
- Goal was to weaken the power of lineages and to increase the inheritance going to the Church.

Medieval Church exposure (550–1500) and pre-industrial kinship intensity

Source: Schulz et al. (Science, 2019)




Fig. 1. Church exposure and kinship intensity around the world. (**A**) Exposure to the medieval Western (blue shading) and Eastern (green shading) Churches at the country level. The inset shows the Western Church exposure for regions within Europe based on the diffusion of bishoprics between 550 and 1500 CE (blue shading). The map delineates the boundaries of the Carolingian Empire (orange line) and the divide between Western and socialist Europe (pink line; after Churchill's Iron Curtain speech). (**B**) The kinship intensity index (KII) for ethnolinguistic groups around the world.

Kinship intensity

- Measures 'kinship intensity' using the pre-industrial presence of:
  1. An extended (non-nuclear) family system
  2. Post-marital residence with parents
  3. Lineages (unilineal descent system – not cognatic)
  4. Localized clans (where those in the same clan live together)

Medieval Church exposure (550–1500) and pre-industrial kinship intensity

Source: Schulz et al. (Science, 2019)





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Medieval Church exposure (550–1500) and 20th century cousin marriage

Source: Schulz et al. (Science, 2019)



Psychological consequences of kinship intensity




Fig. 2. Medieval Church exposure, kinship intensity, and psychological variation. Cross-country relationship between our Individualistic-Impersonal Psychological Scale and (**A**) medieval Church exposure and (**B**) kinship intensity. The inset in (B) shows the relationship for cousin marriage rates, while the main plot shows the relationship with the KII. Countries primarily exposed to the Western Church are identified with a dot (blue solid best-fit lines), and countries primarily exposed to the Eastern Church are identified by a diamond (green short-dashed best-fit lines). Triangles denote minimal church exposure (i.e., an exposure of <0.3 centuries). Color coding refers to the duration of Eastern (green) and Western (blue) Church exposure. The reported correlation coefficients for the Western (Eastern) Church were computed after excluding the Eastern (Western) Church–exposed countries.

Kinship tightness and economic development

Source: Enke (QJE, 2019)





Figure 9: Kinship tightness and development over time. The left panel shows the results of OLS regressions in which I regress country-level log population density in a given year on kinship tightness. Each dot represents the OLS point estimate for the regression in the respective year, and the color coding denotes levels of significance. In all regressions, the sample is restricted to countries in which at least 50% of the population are native, resulting in a sample of 103 countries. The right panel follows an analogous logic, except that the dependent variables are urbanization rates.

"Where you stand determines what you see" (Dr. Ehret)


- This literature shows that it is not societies within the African continent that are different.
- Instead, it is Western European societies (and their offshoots) that are different (WEIRD).
- Family, kinship, and lineage is too often viewed through a Western lens despite the West being the outlier.
- Will give two examples to help illustrate this:
  1. Matrilineal kinship
  2. Bride price

Example 1: Matrilineal kinship



Legend: ▲ = Males, ● = Females, ●/▲ = Same Matriliny

(a) Matrilineal Kinship




Legend: ▲ = Males, ● = Females, ●/▲ = Same Patriliny

(b) Patrilineal Kinship

On the "Matrilineal Puzzle"


- Anthropologists of the 20th century were perplexed by matrilineal kinship.
  - E.g., Robin Fox (1934); Audrey Richards (1950)
- Matriliny creates conflicting allegiances within the household.
  - Why would such a system ever emerge?
- This was called the "matrilineal puzzle."

The global distribution of traditional matrilineal kinship



Distribution of matrilineal kinship within Africa

Source: Lowes (2020)



Distribution of matrilineal kinship within the Dem. Rep. of Congo

Source: Lowes (2020)

Figure 7: DHS Clusters and Matrilineal Belt





Figure 3: Matrilineal Belt and Villages of Origin for Sample



Findings

Matrilineal kinship is associated with:

1. Children that are healthier
2. Children that are educated.
3. Wives that are happier.
4. Wives that are more empowered and less accepting of violence.
5. Households with less domestic violence.
6. Households with less cooperation between husbands and wives.

The wellbeing of children (Kananga survey)

Table 13: Child Health and Education in Sample

	Linear Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude			
	Within 100 kms of Matrilineal Belt			
	Child Sick in Last Month		*Years of Education*	
	All Ages (1)	All Ages (2)	Age>5 (3)	Age>5 (4)
Matrilineal	-0.079*	-0.093**	0.607***	0.462***
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.186)	(0.160)
Mother's Char.	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	831	831	503	503
Clusters	196	196	166	166
Mean Dep. Var.	0.280	0.280	4.57	4.57

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the village of origin level. Regressions control for age and age squared of child and province fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) control for the mother's education level, age and age squared. *Matrilineal* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the mother of the child is matrilineal. *Child Sick in Last Month* is whether the child has been sick in the last month; the response options were 0 for No and 1 for Yes. *Years of Education* is number of years of education completed by the child. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Measuring cooperation: Two-player public goods game



- Husbands and wives play with each other.
  - Make decisions separately and in private.
- Each rolls a die to determine their endowment:
  - Equal probability of 1000CF or 1500CF.
- Each decides how much to contribute to the 'communal pot'.
  - The 'communal pot' is increased by 1.5 and then divided evenly.

Experiment, connection to real life, and findings

- Experiment was designed to capture key aspects of the dynamics of household relationships.
- Behavior in the game is interpreted as being informative of behavior in similar real-life situations.
- When a participant receives the 1500CF endowment:
  - The participant can always claim that they only received 1000CF.
  - Study finds that less is contributed to the communal pot...
  - but only if the participant is a wife who is from a matrilineal ethnic group.

Returning to the 'Matrilineal puzzle'

- Western researchers have asked: "Why are (some African) societies matrilineal?"
- Lowes shows that less cooperation in matrilineal households is associated with **better** outcomes and not worse as had always been presumed.
- The real question should be: "Why aren't more societies (including European ones) matrilineal?"

Example 2: Bride price

Bride Price: Transfer of resources from the groom and/or groom's parents to the bride's parents at marriage.






Bride price as a purchase price?

- Early anthropologists interpreted the transfer as a purchase of the bride and called it 'bride price'.
- In a 1952 article, Bernhard Vroklage reflects on this writing:
  - "When, however, ethnologists became better informed, it appeared that. . . there was no question of real buying or of a price in the sense of a payment" (p. 135)
  - Rather it is a gift of appreciation for "the care and trouble spent on the bride's upbringing." (p. 135)
  - "It is a compensation for the loss of the bride, who becomes incorporated into another family group. . . a woman is "the source of life" and her children will belong to the family group of the husband." (p. 137)
  - "If one considers the bride price in this way, it is not a humiliating thing at all, on the contrary it is rather something honourable." (p. 139)

Prevalence of traditional bride price marriage customs




Global prevalence of traditional marriage customs across ethnic groups (from Ethnographic sources)


	Global		Indonesia		Zambia	
	Number	Share	Number	Share	Number	Share
Bride Price	**646**	**0.52**	**13**	**0.46**	**8**	**0.38**
Bride Service	123	0.10	2	0.07	6	0.29
Token Bride Price	68	0.05	2	0.07	7	0.33
Gift Exchange	62	0.05	3	0.11	0	0.00
Female Relative Exchange	39	0.03	4	0.14	0	0.00
Absence of Consideration	275	0.22	4	0.14	0	0.00
Dowry	33	0.03	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total	1246	1.00	28	1.00	21	1.00

Variation in the practice of bride price

Ashraf, Bau, Nunn, and Voena (JPE, 2020)



(a) Prevalence in Zambia



(b) Prevalence in Indonesia

School construction in Zambia & Indonesia

- Both countries had large national school construction programs.
- School construction had a large effect on boys' education, but no (average) effect on girls' education.
- However, the zero effect masks significant heterogeneity:
  1. For some ethnic groups, the effect is positive and very large.
  2. For others, the effect is zero.
- School construction only increased girls education where there was the bride price.

Bride price and education in Zambia

Think about the factors that affect bride price today. What is the. . . most important factor?				
		First	*Second*	*Third*
Education	obs	543	223	152
		37.3%	15.3%	10.4%
Good morals	obs	191	283	216
		13.1%	19.4%	14.8%
Family values	obs	214	272	206
		14.7%	18.7%	14.2%
Virginity	obs	137	186	179
		9.4%	12.8%	12.3%
Age	obs	41	94	141
		2.8%	6.5%	9.7%
Ethnicity	obs	104	117	190
		7.1%	8.0%	13.1%
Other	obs	144	118	85
		9.9%	8.1%	5.8%


Bride price and education in Zambia and Indonesia


Table 4: Determinants of bride price payment amounts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Dependent Variable: Log Bride Price Amount										
	Indonesia (IFLS)					2SLS	Zambia (ZFPS)				
Wife's Education:											
$I_i^{Primary}$	0.615***	0.579***	0.366***	0.373***	0.285**	2.329**	0.002	0.023	-0.015	-0.008	-0.027
	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.111)	(1.173)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.141)
$I_i^{JuniorSecondary}$	0.658***	0.672***	0.471***	0.456***	0.391***		0.134	0.258*	0.255*	0.279**	0.289**
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.097)		(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.143)
$I_i^{SeniorSecondary}$	0.865***	0.857***	0.468***	0.457***	0.306***		0.384***	0.391***	0.398**	0.396**	0.358**
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.115)		(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.154)
Husband's Education:											
$I_i^{H:Primary}$			0.237***	0.212**	0.175				0.230	0.239	0.270
			(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.118)				(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.196)
$I_i^{H:JuniorSecondary}$			0.414***	0.439***	0.470***				0.173	0.176	0.158
			(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.103)				(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.163)
$I_i^{H:SeniorSecondary}$			0.532***	0.540***	0.427***				-0.080	-0.079	-0.070
			(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.114)				(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.129)
F-test for first stage						3.04					
Baseline Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Wife Marriage Age Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Husband Marriage Age Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Wife's Premarital Wealth	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Wife Muslim	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Polygynous Marriage	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Mean of dependent variable	11.501	11.495	11.553	11.595	12.335	11.234	7.327	7.327	7.330	7.330	7.326
SD of dependent variable	2.375	2.366	2.342	2.309	1.965	2.596	1.293	1.292	1.292	1.292	1.290
Number of observations	5,555	5,092	4,713	4,548	2,190	264	542	543	540	540	539
Adjusted R^2	0.467	0.463	0.472	0.467	0.344	0.433	0.229	0.237	0.241	0.242	0.240

Value of the bride price in the DRC (n =634)

Lowes and Nunn (2018)





Value of the bride price

A higher bride price transfer is associated with:

- Wives are less acceptance of domestic violence.
- Wife's self-reported happiness is higher.
- Husband's happiness is no different.
- Marriage is more cooperative/cohesive (more activities done together).

Bride price repayment

- Some aspects of bride price are negatively associated with a wife's happiness.
- A higher bride price is associated with greater happiness for the wife.
- But, if tradition dictates that the bride price must be fully paid back upon divorce, then this positive relationship become negative.
  - When bride price must be paid back, a higher bride price is associated with less happiness for the wife.
  - Could be explained by a higher bride price making it more difficult for a wife to leave an unhappy relationship.

Bride price

- The Western presumption that bride price is a payment for the bride and therefore the practice is bad is uninformed and simplistic.
- When one looks at the empirical evidence, it is not clear that the custom, on the whole, is detrimental to women.
- (Likely) because of a Western bias in research, despite being a very common tradition globally, little quantitative analysis has been done estimating its consequences.

Concluding thoughts: Takeaway points

- Europeans are WEIRD (they are the exception).
- Has been a bias in the literature to study the psychology, culture and traditions of WEIRD cultures and assume these represent the whole world.
- Remember Dr. Ehret's lecture: "Where you stand matters."
- There has been a tendency to look at Africa while "standing" in Europe or the U.S.
  - The 'matrilineal puzzle'
  - Bride price

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